Abstract. We consider Robert Axelrod's tribute model at the light shed by the development of a choice framework called BVG (beliefs, values and goals). BVG agents use multi-varied, situated and individual rationality to perform adaptive choices in social environments. We then take the original experiment and carry it over using this choice sheme. By explicitly representing the agents preferences and the related decisional mechanisms, we are able to easily extend the experiment to tackle issues only implicitly addressed. The outcome of these new experiments is somewhat surprising, and seems to undermine the original conclusions. The experiments were carried out in a similar way to that of the original ones. However, we sustain that a more holistic attitude towards experimentation may be preferable. We conclude by arguing that the model of multiple values may help to principle the relation between experimenter and experiment, through the strengthening of bridges between the design of the experiment and the design of the agents involved in the simulation.
Introduction
Simulation systems can give emphasis to various aspects: economical (eg. [5] ), social (for instance the prisonner's dilemma game [3] ), biological [6] , or political [4] . In [4] , Axelrod examines how political actors can emerge from aggregations of smaller political units. Unlike in most game theoretical models, the actors involved in the simulation are not given a priori. Instead, Axelrod shows how groups of actors behaving as independent political entities can emerge out of interactions of basic units, during the simulation of a "tribute" model where units compete with each other for "wealth."
In our previous work [1, 2] , we have been concerned with agent's decision, i.e., the choice of a preferred option from among a large set of alternatives, according to the precise context where they are immersed. Such a capability defines to what extent they are autonomous. But, there is no one way of deciding, and the classical mode of taking utility functions as the sole support is not adequate for situations constrained by qualitative features (such as wine selection, or putting together a football team). The BVG (beliefs-values-goals) agent architecture relies on the use of values (multiple dimensions against which to evaluate a situation) to perform choice among a set of candidate goals. Values can also be used to guide the adoption of new goals from other agents. We argue that agents should base their rationalities on choice rather than search.
In this paper, we take Axelrod's example and verify the effectiveness of the application of the multiple value scheme. We start by describing the example as it is originally presented, adn then rebuild it in the BVG architecture. Then we show how this new scheme allows for the easy extension of the original experiment, and enrich it: in the models adopted for the description of the societies; in the models of agent; in the evaluation measures adopted; in the terms of the experiments. The kernel of the changes to the model is done through a movement of explicitation of the values involved.
Choice and evaluation
The role of value as a mental attitude towards decision is to provide a reference framework to represent agent's preference during deliberation (the pondering of options candidate to contribute to a selected goal). In the BVG choice framework, the agent's system of values evolves as a consequence of the agent's assessment of the results of previous decisions. Decisions are evaluated against certain dimensions (that could be the same previously used for the decision or not), and this assessment is fed back into the agent's mind, by adapting the mechanisms associated with choice. This is another point that escapes the traditional utilitarian view, where the world (and so the agent) is static and known. BVG agents can adapt to an environment where everything changes, including the agent's own preferences (for instance as a result of interactions). This is especially important in a multi-agent environment, since the agents are autonomous, and so potentially sources of change and novelty.
The evaluation of the results of our evaluations becomes a central issue, and this question directly points to the difficulties in assessing the results of experiments. We would need meta-values to evaluate those results. But if those "higher values" exist (and so they are the important ones) why not use them for decision?
When tackling the issue of choice, the formulation of hypotheses and experimental predictions becomes delicate. If the designer tells the agent how to choose, how can he not know exactly how the agent will choose? To formulate experimental predictions and then evaluate to what extent they are fulfilled becomes a spurious game: it amounts to perform calculations about knowledge and reasons, and not to judge to what extent those reasons are the best reasons, and correctly generate the choices. We return to technical reasons for behaviour, in detriment of the will and the preferences of the agent.
By situating the agent in an environment with other agents, autonomy becomes a key ingredient, to be used with care and balance. The duality of value sets becomes a necessity, as agents cannot access values at the macro level, made judiciously coincide with the designer values. The answer is the designer, and the problem is methodological. The update mechanism provides a way to put to test this liaison between agent and designer. The designer's model of choice cannot be the model of perfect choice against which the whole world is to be evaluated. It is our strong conviction that the perfect choice does not exist. It is a model of choice to be compared to another one, by using criteria that in turn may not be perfect.
The tribute model
The basic units of the tribute model are ten actors, organised in a ring [4] . Each actor has some initial wealth, uniformly distributed between 300 and 500. In each cycle (called year), three actors are chosen to become active. An active actor can demand tribute (250) to its neighbour, and in turn, this can choose to pay or to fight, depending on which will cause less loss of wealth. Aliances are then introduced, according to a table of "commitments" between pairs or actors. An active actor can demand tribute from another if he can form a continuous sequence of allied countries one of each is neighbour to the target.
According to Axelrod, it isn't possible to develop completely rational rules for decision taking (obviously, for a "normal" notion of rationality). So, each agent uses heuritic rules of decision to capture some of the short term consideration the player find. The active actor chooses to demand tribute from a target that maximises the product of vulnerability for possible payment. The vulnerability is defined as
, where W A and W T are respectively the wealth of the attacker and of the target.
When actors engage in alliances, the commitment of actor i towards actor j increases (by 10%, until a maximum of 100%) when i pay tribute to j (subservience), i receives tribute from j (protection), or i fights in the same alliance than j (friendship). It decreases (by 10%, until a minimum of 0) when they fight in opposite alliances.
Re-representing the model
The first thing to do is to determine which are the values involved, which is not always obvious. This is evident when Axelrod claims that only one resource is involved, without noting that commitments between actors can be seen as a resource. Actually, these are the main values involved here, and the calculus used for choice shows clearly that they are displayed in a hierarchy, where commitment has top priority, i.e., it is the most important value. This fact leads to an agent always respecting its commitment to another, even if that is damaging to its own wealth. But this fact also certifies that wealth is not the only resource involved.
So, leaving commitments out for the moment, the individual decision problem is solved by using the following rules, for attacking actor (a):
so to maximise the productVuln a (i) × PossPay a (i)
(1) Do nothing otherwise (2) and for the attacked actor:
Now we add the additional value, commitment. Other modifications could be considered, like taking commitment as another resource to manage, or taking new actions IncreaseCommitment and DecreaseCommitment, now relevant to the decision making. If we don't embrace these questions is because they change the character of the problem.
The decision rules 1 to 4 can be kept with few changes, since the active actor still bases its decision in its individual gain, and not on the interest of its coalition. Besides, those coalitions depend on who the particular attacking and defending agents are. Despite the fact that the results sometimes show the formation of groups with common interests, there are also internal fights among the weaker partners inside those groups.
So, for the attacking actor (a) 1 :
and for the attacked actor (t):
This case is interesting because in deliberation there is one hierarchy of values, and in choice it is inverted. When each actor performs its calculations to decide if it should attack or not (or if it should join a coalition or not), commitment overcomes self interest in terms of wealth. But when it finally decides, the actor prefers the combination that provides greater gains for itself, neverminding the interests of its supporting group. In the light of the previous sections, it seems evident that there are more values at stake, namely, the confidence that our allies are really our allies, the fickleness of those allies, the gratitude (and consequent will of reciprocation) for the aid given, and of course the already mentioned collective interests in terms of wealth. Some of these values become relevant for the extensions to the model we present next, which illustrate the advantages of the BVG architecture.
Axelrod himself examines his model and proposes some modifications, whose results he evaluates. Some of the most interesting from the decision-making standpoint are questions involving emergence of behaviours. (In the full paper we discuss some of these issues.)
We decided to experiment with the model by relaxing some of the constraints originally imposed. The one we chose to present in this paper deals with the variability of the acuisition of commitment towards other agent. Where Axelrod sets a (negative or positive) increment of 10%, we propose to use a variable quantity, which depends on a value we called fickleness: a fickler actor has bigger commitment increments. Following the original model, there aren't big changes in the rules, or their order of application. In particular, this new value is permanently in the top of the hierarchy, establishing the commitments, so determining the variations in wealth, through the results of decisions. The rules that set the dynamics of the relations among these values are the following (":=" is the symbol for assignment and ";" means sequencing of commands, i, j, k, l are actors, and v a if fickleness of actor a):
The anedoctal type of presentation of results used by Axelrod does not ease up the comparision with other experiments, even because of the important intervention of random phenomena, of impossible reproduction. Hence, it is difficult to take the model as designed by Axelrod as a starting point, and let the changes we proposed provide a more complete version of the model. How could we comparatively evaluate the performances? It seems nevertheless clear that BVG architecture can provide a more principled approach to the implementation of this model, and allow a more systematic exploration of the agent design space [7] .
This model of multi-agent simulation exhibits overly orchestrated interactions among the agents. As a matter of fact, we are in a closed world, a game, in which only some randomness prevents the discovery of the easy solution, and a winning behaviour. Even so, that rationality is never taken into account in the agent's reasoning, they use their designer's heuristics to make the necessary decisions, always in the more predictable way. What is nevertheless fascinating is the way how the simplicity of individual processes leads to behaviours that are so interesting from the observer standpoint (and recognisable in real situations from the history of politics).
Summary of experimental results
The experimental work was centred around the consequences in the simulations of the use of value "Commitment." For that purpose, we have introduced previously the notion of fickleness of an actor, v a , that is, the quantity of Commitment which is incremented or decremented as a consequence of each interaction. With this little extension to the original model, we aim at testing te applicability of the multiple values framework and of the BVG architecture. In particular, by adding new values to the model (or, better said, by expliciting a previously existing value), we emphacise a methodological added value in the value-based approach. To that end, our experimental exploration work follows closely the style of exploration conducted by Axelrod himself.
We performed series of 1000 runs of the simulation, with the following parameters. In each run, the same sequence of random numbers (and so countries become active in the same sequence) is used with fickleness set to all the agents, first at 0%, then 5%, 10% (original value), 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%. Table 1 . Minimum, average, and maximum total wealth, obtained in 1000 runs of the simulation. Table 1 shows the minimum, average, and maximum of the total wealth (i.e. the sum of the wealth of all the nations), obtained in 1000 runs (1000 iterations each) of the simulation. Apart from the case where all ficklenesses are zero (which in practice doesn't allow for coalitions), there is a light pattern of evolution of the medium wealth with a growth aproximately linear. Actually, the zero commitment avoids many fights that are possible only in alliance (fights with distances greater tharn one neighbour). And a society that does not engage into fights looses less wealth (in fights there is not transfer of wealth, rather loss). Table 2 . Minimum, average, and maximum number of fights, obtained in 1000 runs of the simulation.
But the analisys of table 2 does not show a corresponding proportional decrease in the average number of fights. Again excluding the case when all commitments are zero, the maximum average number of fights is obtained with agent's fickleness equal to 50%, and the minima are at the extremes of the interval. Apparently, more fickleness, before the amount of 50%, yields an increase of the total wealth, but without reducing the number of fights. So, we have more fights, but causing less damages.
To investigate how this could be possible, we deviced a battery of experiments to find out how the variation of commitment interferes with the agents interactions. Having the original experiments in mind, we preferred to keep the same order of execution of the agents (that is, we kept the experiment controlled from the standpoint of the random numbers that generate the activation sequence), and varied only the commitments. Subsequent tests showed that the activation sequences were not fundamentally important, and the conclusions of these series of experiments can be considered general.
Along several series of experiments (that cannot be included in this extended abstract due to space limitations), and control tests, we reached several interesting conclusions, summarised ahead.
In a first series of simulations, we kept v i = 0%, ∀i, and then gradually increased some of the v i , so that the effect of the participation of actors in more and more global fights could be analysed. It resulted clear that a country doesn't have any gain in having a greater commitment towards another, it rather exposes itself to more damage. The advantage seems to reside in getting supoprt rather then concede it. But neither is that surprising, nor do all its consequences are already visible.
Afterwards, we aim at favouring the constitution of two antagonistic blocks. We have confirmed a conjecture that a high fickleness leads to stable coalitions earlier, and so decreases the number of fights.
In table 3 , we try to cause other block formations. In the first experiment, some coalitions are immediately formed to the right of 0 and 5, but with the other neighbourgh the relation is unstable. So, both 0 and 5 do not grow. A similar situation occurs in the next experiment, with a quick formation of coalitions, all to the same side, but now causing the end of fights. As expected, the five countries with zero fickleness (and so zero commitment) are the ones to grow. The demands are made to one and another sides, since commitments are not reciprocal, and this allows to make demands without risking own wealth.
In the third line simulation, the coalition (6,7,8) stabilises quickly, whereas coalition (1,2,3) takes longer. Only when the latter coalition remains stable do fights stop. A third coalition (8,9,0,1) is formed, but it takes even longer, because v 0 = 10, although v 9 = 5− contributes to stability. During the simulation, country 5 comes to be one of the richest, but looses all due to demands from the coalition to its left. Country 3 also has attempts of growth, but was successively attacked by 0, who, in the joint coalition with 8, have considerable force.
Finaly, the last experiment of this series shows that countries with greater fickleness end up by fixing themselves easily in coalitions, especially in the company with similar partners. Neighbours to the ficklest, once obtained total adhesion, keep colligated, unless the non-neighbours, that fight a lot with their neighbours. The ones in the coalition fight from the distance, and keep in good terms with their neighbours.
In the last series of simulations (table 4) , we invert the terms of the experiments, and keep few countries with zero fickleness. As always, the un-allied profit from using the others while not letting themselves be used. We confirm as well that low values of fickleness favour the existence of many fights, and not their disappearance. An interesting experiment is that of the third line. Quickly, coalitions (2,3,4), (4, 5, 6, 7) , and (7, 8, 9 ) are formed. The bigger coalition generates wealthy countries 5 and 7, but it is noteworthy that country 1 starts off by getting wealthy first, and is then is persecuted by 0, who takes all its wealth away. Country 0 has support from 7, 8, and 9, while 1 has support from 2, 3, and 4, but only at times. Suport from 7 is fundamental for the growth of 0. When this support appears, 1 cannot keep demanding tribute from 0, since its supporters 2 and 3 are weak, whereas 7, 8, and 9 are very strong.
In sum, regional (local) influence is quite important, as well as specific circumstances at the time of activation. Stable coalitions favour the growth of internal collective wealth, and ease up the defense against attacks from outside the coalition. Less obvious is the fact that a high fickleness always allow to keep the stability of coalitions. However it is always possible to ensure a higher stability through the increase of fickleness. And on the other side, high fickleness offers a greater number of possibilities for the formation of stable coalitions, since it is easier to reach the commitment levels to favour that formation.
Some of our results are already dealt with in Axelrod's account, but we believe our approach carries some added value. Namely, some of the questions originally put as variations of the model can now have clearer answers. Axelrod claims that even if the runs are extended to 10000 iterations, the model doesn't settle down, and there are repeated large wars. As we have seen, this conclusion can be withdrawn by adding fickler countries, that tend to keep keen to their friends. On the other hand, Axelrod sustains that it pays to give and receive commitments, but our conclusion is quite different: what pays is to have supporting friends, and that can be achieved by having commited neighbours, while saving wealth through uncommiting.
Conclusions
One main conclusion is that even in the extended tribute model, coalitions have one rich country, most times only one. Only really big coalitions can allow two rich countries to develop, far from each other. More seldom it is possible to find a neighbour to a rich country with a comfortable amount of wealth, but always in a very unbalanced strength relation.
Rich countries have all interest in maintaining a support group, but giving as little support themselves as they can, in order to protect their own wealth. This unbalanced confidence relation between countries is not uncovered in the model of [4] , and reveals a virtue in the methodological approach based on the analisys of relevant values for the decision situation.
During our extensive experimentation, we focussed on the issue of fight control and its consequences for wealth. The core idea of modelling of the choice process was always present in our approach, since our position is that the mentality of the agents is determinant for their behaviour. We unveiled some regularities in the global social behaviour, but sustain that more experimentation is still in need, to stress our conclusions, as well as answer new challenges in this stimulating field. However, the conduction of experiments should be more principled, and we believe that the BVG choice model can privide bridges to fill the gap between the experiment designer and the mental models of the agents involved.
